Lecture � logic & language I

Prof Edgington - Merton St

@10 on Wednesday, 03 May, 2000

 

Frege

German philosopher, mathematician 1848-1945

we owe him today�s modern standard logic

re: structure + workings of language

immediate impact on Russell and early Wittgenstein

and also the logical positivists (the Vienna circle), e.g. Hempel, Karnap

his primary goal: bring rigour to maths, developing water-tight notion of proof � logic before was too crude for the intricacies of maths, to distinguish valid/invalid forms of reasoning

Frege = a sort of Aristotelian logic: recognises certain patterns of syllogism

 

Before Frege

principle weakness: could tell us about the inferential powers of sentences containing more than one expression of generality

e.g. everybody loves at least somebody

but maths is replete with relations

many attempts to solve, but no general solution

 

there was no conception of a complete propositional logic

 

Frege�s general theory of language

 

1.      the sentence = the primary unit of language

= the unit by which we perform a speech act, �make a move in the language game�, get across a belief � sub-sentential components are simply means to that end

 

2.      arguably, indicative sentences are the most basic kind

a proposition can be put forward with different force (statement, question, command etc.)

indicative - adj. 1 Gram. Designating the mood of a verb of which the essential function is to state an objective fact (as opp. to something wished, thought of, etc., by the speaker). lme.

a. j. ayer Every indicative sentence, whether it is literally meaningful or not, shall be regarded as expressing a statement.

if we focus on indicative sentences, and the rest will fall into place

 

3.      meanings of words � systematic contributions to meanings of sentences

word = smallest semantically significant unit, out of which sentences are constructed

�word� does not necessarily correspond to the spaces in a sentence - endings to form plurals, comparatives, tenses

e.g. �walked� contains 2 semantically significant units

never ask for the meaning of a word in isolation - Frege

no point in establishing word-world relations, or symbols standing for something, unless you go on to use them

to know the meaning of an indicative sentence is to know under what conditions it is true � Frege

 

4.      meaning of indicative sentences = truth condition

someone who understands knows how things have to be in order to be true

2 sentences can have the same truth conditions, but still have different tone/colouring

e.g. dog/cur, and/but

what is it to know the truth conditions of a sentence?

by showing that you know how to find out whether or not a sentence is true

= a verificationist theory of meaning

e.g. this painting was painted by Goya

well, I know about painting, Goya and about this painting, so I understand it

but if someone asks me if the sentence is true, I won�t have any idea � I will need to ask an art historian � so demanding that we know how to find out if it�s true seems like a more demanding criteria

raises the question: what is truth?

truth is useful for certain types of generality � but shouldn�t think of it as substantive at all (Horrock � trying to define meaning without reference to truth)

= deflationist

substantive = adj. 1 Having a separate and independent existence; not dependent on or subsidiary to another, independent, self-sufficient. lme.

Davidson

 

 

 

5.      different semantic categories of words

words make different semantic contributions to sentences in which they occur

proper names - for singular terms, i.e. any expression whose purpose is to identify objects, incl I, you, that painting, the capital of France

many sentences are about objects. its truth conditions depend on which objects the sentence is about, so the job of this category is to identify on which objects the sentence depends

 

6.      predicates

Frege: difference between name + predicate = more radical than previously thought

before: predicates were founded on t notion of a name, general names, as opp to particulars, names of properties

 

but how can 2 names make a sentence which says something T/F?

predicate = becomes a sentence when the gaps are filled with names

e.g. ______ walked

so predicates are like sentences, but incomplete

 

there are complex predicates, just as there are complex single terms

take a complex sentence, remove a name, and you have a predicate

Dummett � uses complex predicates for multiple generalities

 

 

 

Quantification theory

� logic of expressions of generality

in the context of his

 

 

Questions

1.      difference tween indicative/declarative?

2.      what is the �mood� of a verb?